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Investigating the Dynamics of Political Compromise

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  • Alan E. Wiseman

    (Political Science at the Ohio State Universitywiseman.69@osu.edu)

Abstract

Using data on party representation for the Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means Committees from the 47th–103rd Congresses, I test the implications of a recently developed theory by Dixit, Grossman, and Gul. Their theory predicts that, in any particular Congress, majority and minority party representation on committees should be a function of the maximum political strength enjoyed by the majority party during the entire period for which it has held majority status up to, and including, that Congress. I refute this hypothesis and find that for any given Congress, majority party representation on committees is determined, rather, by the current political strength of the majority party. These findings speak to broad questions about our understanding of the role of the minority party in legislative organization and lawmaking in legislative politics, and in the US Congress, in particular.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan E. Wiseman, 2005. "Investigating the Dynamics of Political Compromise," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(4), pages 497-514, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:17:y:2005:i:4:p:497-514
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629805056898
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Charles Bradbury & W. Mark Crain, 2002. "Bicameral Legislatures and Fiscal Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(3), pages 646-659, January.
    2. Pablo T. Spiller, 2003. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 281-306, October.
    3. Avinash Dixit & Gene M. Grossman & Faruk Gul, 2000. "The Dynamics of Political Compromise," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 531-568, June.
    4. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
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