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The Politics of Delay in Crisis Negotiations

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  • Haonan Dong

Abstract

States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Haonan Dong, 2025. "The Politics of Delay in Crisis Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 69(5), pages 793-813, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:69:y:2025:i:5:p:793-813
    DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267777
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