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The Dark Side of Altruistic Third-Party Punishment

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Leibbrandt

    (University of Chicago and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University)

  • Raúl López-Pérez

    (Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Autoónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain)

Abstract

This article experimentally studies punishment from unaffected third parties in ten different games. The authors show that third-party punishment exhibits several features that are arguably undesirable. First, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses a socially efficient or a Pareto efficient allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Interestingly, this form of punishment is especially pronounced in women and more left-wing participants. Second, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses an equitable allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Finally, third parties considerably punish passive parties who make no choice, especially if the latter are richer than the third party. Implications of these findings for social theory are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Leibbrandt & Raúl López-Pérez, 2011. "The Dark Side of Altruistic Third-Party Punishment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(5), pages 761-784, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:55:y:2011:i:5:p:761-784
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tan, Fangfang & Xiao, Erte, 2018. "Third-party punishment: Retribution or deterrence?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 34-46.
    2. Natalia Jiménez & Ángel Solano-García, 2015. "Elected Officials’ Opportunistic Behavior on Third-Party Punishment: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers. Serie EC 2015-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    3. Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth & Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Orland, 2020. "Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?," CEPA Discussion Papers 17, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
    4. Yuzhen Li & Jun Luo & He Niu & Hang Ye, 2023. "When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 423-465, April.
    5. Leibbrandt, Andreas & López-Pérez, Raúl & Spiegelman, Eli, 2023. "Reciprocal, but inequality averse as well? Mixed motives for punishment and reward," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 91-116.
    6. Müller, Julia & Schwieren, Christiane & Spitzer, Florian, 2016. "What Drives Destruction? On the Malleability of Anti-Social Behavior," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 238, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    7. Feess, Eberhard & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Schramm, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2018. "The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence: Theory and evidence from the laboratory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 58-73.
    8. Sven Fischer & Kristoffel Grechenig & Nicolas Meier, 2013. "Cooperation under punishment: Imperfect information destroys it and centralizing punishment does not help," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_06, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    9. Im, Changkuk & Lee, Jinkwon, 2022. "On the fragility of third-party punishment: The context effect of a dominated risky investment option," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    10. Björn Toelstede, 2019. "How path-creating mechanisms and structural lock-ins make societies drift from democracy to authoritarianism," Rationality and Society, , vol. 31(2), pages 233-262, May.
    11. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2013. "Second vs. Third Party Punishment under Costly Monitoringː A New Experimental Method and Evidence," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 6, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
    12. Leibbrandt, Andreas & López-Pérez, Raúl, 2012. "An exploration of third and second party punishment in ten simple games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 753-766.
    13. Ciril Bosch-Rosa, 2018. "Equality over intentionality: The normative social preferences of neutral third-parties," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(11), pages 1-13, November.
    14. Müller, Julia & Schwieren, Christiane & Spitzer, Florian, 2022. "How to prevent destruction – On the malleability of anti-social behavior," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    15. Guerra, Alice & Zhuravleva, Tatyana, 2021. "Do bystanders react to bribery?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 442-462.
    16. Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Natalia Jiménez & Ángel Solano García, 2012. "The Effect of Elections on Third-Party Punishment: An experimental Analysis," ThE Papers 12/01, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..

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