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The Institutional Design of Riparian Treaties

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  • Jaroslav Tir
  • Douglas M. Stinnett

Abstract

International agreements governing rivers vary considerably in whether they contain institutional provisions for joint monitoring, conflict resolution, enforcement, and/or the delegation of authority to intergovernmental organizations. This article develops an explanation for why some river management treaties include more institutional provisions while others contain fewer, if any. The authors argue that certain types of issues related to river use—water quantity, water quality, and navigation—tend to be difficult to manage and prone to noncompliance. When forming treaties to address these specific issues, states will be more likely to include institutional provisions. The authors test the link between these river use issues and institutional design using a data set of 315 river treaties signed since 1950. The results show that highly contentious issues—and in particular water quantity and navigation—have a greater effect on the institutional design of river treaties than contextual and power politics factors.

Suggested Citation

  • Jaroslav Tir & Douglas M. Stinnett, 2011. "The Institutional Design of Riparian Treaties," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(4), pages 606-631, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:55:y:2011:i:4:p:606-631
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeroen Warner & Neda Zawahri, 2012. "Hegemony and asymmetry: multiple-chessboard games on transboundary rivers," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 215-229, September.
    2. Dinar, Shlomi & Katz, David & De Stefano, Lucia & Blankespoor, Brian, 2014. "Climate change, conflict, and cooperation : global analysis of the resilience of international river treaties to increased water variability," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6916, The World Bank.
    3. Yasir M. Aljefri & Liping Fang & Keith W. Hipel & Kaveh Madani, 2019. "Strategic Analyses of the Hydropolitical Conflicts Surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 305-340, April.

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