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How Civil Wars End

Author

Listed:
  • T. David Mason
  • Patrick J. Fett

    (Department of Political Science, University of Memphis)

Abstract

What conditions determine whether a civil war ends in a negotiated settlement or a military victory? The authors address this question by developing an expected utility model of the choice between seeking an immediate settlement or continuing to fight in anticipation of eventual victory. The model implies that the likelihood of a settlement varies with estimates of the probability of winning, the time required to win, the rate at which the costs of conflict accrue, and the payoffs for victory versus settlement. Logistic regression results suggest that a settlement becomes less likely the larger the government's army and more likely the longer the civil war lasts. Payoff and cost variables had no effect on the likelihood of a settlement.

Suggested Citation

  • T. David Mason & Patrick J. Fett, 1996. "How Civil Wars End," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(4), pages 546-568, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:40:y:1996:i:4:p:546-568
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002796040004002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer, 1974. "The carrot and the stick," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 43-61, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bodea, Cristina & Higashijima, Masaaki & Singh, Raju Jan, 2016. "Oil and Civil Conflict: Can Public Spending Have a Mitigation Effect?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1-12.
    2. Zuleta, Hernando & Villaveces, Marta Juanita & Andonova, Veneta, 2013. "Conflict and negotiation in Colombia: Are pre-donations useful?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 105-117.
    3. Kevin Siqueira, 2003. "Conflict and third-party intervention," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 389-400.
    4. Joakim Kreutz, 2012. "From Tremors to Talks: Do Natural Disasters Produce Ripe Moments for Resolving Separatist Conflicts?," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(4), pages 482-502, September.
    5. Bernardo Pérez Salazar, 2002. "El juego de los dinosaurios," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 4(7), pages 229-242, July-Dece.
    6. Hosli Madeleine O. & Hoekstra Anke, 2013. "What Fosters Enduring Peace? An Analysis of Factors Influencing Civil War Resolution," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 123-155, August.
    7. Oasis Kodila-Tedika, 2012. "Determinants of Peace: A Cross-Country Analysis," Economic Research Guardian, Mutascu Publishing, vol. 2(2), pages 180-200, December.
    8. Nicholas Sambanis, 2002. "A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(3), pages 215-243.

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