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Extensions of Value Solutions in Constant-Sum Non-Sidepayment Games

Author

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  • H. Andrew Michener
  • Mark S. Salzer
  • Greg D. Richardson

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Abstract

This article defines two new solution concepts for non-sidepayment games - the λ-transfer nucleolus and the λ-transfer disruption value - and reports the results of an experiment testing their predictive accuracy against that of a third solution concept, the well-known λ-transfer value (Shapley, 1969). The test was based on data from a laboratory experiment utilizing five-person, two-choice games that were constant-sum in normal form. Goodness-of-fit results show that the λ-transfer value and the λ-transfer disruption value were about equally accurate in predicting the observed payoffs to players in these games; both of these solutions were more accurate than the λ-transfer nucleolus.

Suggested Citation

  • H. Andrew Michener & Mark S. Salzer & Greg D. Richardson, 1989. "Extensions of Value Solutions in Constant-Sum Non-Sidepayment Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(3), pages 530-553, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:33:y:1989:i:3:p:530-553
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002789033003008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Andrew Michener, H. & Choi, Young C. & Dettman, David C., 1986. "Stability by deterrence in cooperative non-sidepayment n-person games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 375-402, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roger A McCain, 2013. "Value Solutions in Cooperative Games," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 8528, August.

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