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Simple Model of Negotiation

Author

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  • Otomar J. Bartos

    (Department of Sociology University of Colorado)

Abstract

The objective of the paper is to state a simple theory of negotiation, one that is both realistic and testable. The basis of this theory is the notion, stated most clearly by sociologist George Homans, that men strive to create and maintain the conditions of justice. To this notion is added the fact that the well-known Nash solution to bargaining games not only is consistent with Homan's notion of justice but also is reached frequently in experimental negotiations. Given these ingredients, the paper hypothesizes that negotiators view the midpoint between their past demands and offers as just and strive to achieve it. Various implications of this hypothesis are explored.

Suggested Citation

  • Otomar J. Bartos, 1977. "Simple Model of Negotiation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(4), pages 565-579, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:21:y:1977:i:4:p:565-579
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277702100402
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    Cited by:

    1. Rudolf Vetschera & Michael Filzmoser & Ronald Mitterhofer, 2014. "An Analytical Approach to Offer Generation in Concession-Based Negotiation Processes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 71-99, January.
    2. Michael Filzmoser & Johannes R. Gettinger, 2019. "Offer and veto: an experimental comparison of two negotiation procedures," EURO Journal on Decision Processes, Springer;EURO - The Association of European Operational Research Societies, vol. 7(1), pages 83-99, May.

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