Author
Abstract
One of the main goals of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) has, since long, been the democratisation of international order. It is highly critical of the undemocratic nature of important international organisations like the United Nations, the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund); and for the last several years has been fighting the inequality and oligarchism built into these vital organisations affecting, obviously, the life, development and security of many countries. But this campaign of the NAM would be lacking to a great extent in credibility and strength if the organization itself suffers from the same flaws and deficiencies. Unless the NAM is democratic in its structure and functioning, it has little moral right to point its finger at the absence of democracy in other international bodies. No member of the NAM has got “veto†power or “weightage voting†, the characteristic features of Great Power dominance in the Security Council and the World Bank respectively. But this is not enough to conclusively suggest that the NAM is a democratic body. To have a better idea about this, one has to examine its decision-making processes: whether all members have an equal voice in the formulation of its policies and programmes. For this purpose we need to look into the dynamics of the diplomacy of non-aligned summits. What are the various inputs of the decisions taken by these summits'! Do some countries wield more power than others? Apart from the big-small differential, the examination of non-aligned summit diplomacy may reveal some other important variables like the Cold War/ideological cleavage, communalism, regionalism, etc. The more powerful these divisive forces are, the weaker is the NAM. One of the wellknown features of decision-making at non-aligned meetings is “consensus.†Its members seem to be demanding a lot of credit for practising “consensus†which, they claim, is not only highly democratic but also unifying in nature. A critical look at this phenomenon would be in order. It would also be important to find out if external forces try to influence the non-aligned policies. What are the various strategies employed by the Great Powers of rival Cold War sides to influence the deliberation and decisions of non-aligned summits? These are some of the issues which have been dealt with here.
Suggested Citation
J.K. Barm, 1989.
"Non-Aligend Summit Diplomacy,"
India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, , vol. 45(1), pages 1-20, January.
Handle:
RePEc:sae:indqtr:v:45:y:1989:i:1:p:1-20
DOI: 10.1177/097492848904500101
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