Military Regimes in Bangladesh and Pakistan: Strategies of Sustenance and Survival

Scholastic output on Third World military regimes has been prodigious. However, not a single comparative study of any aspect of military role and rule in Pakistan (1958 to 1981, except for the Bhutto interregnum) and Bangladesh (1975–1981), has yet been attempted. Capturing power may not be problematic for the functionaries of the Armed Forces; the consolidation of their authority is infinitely more difficult. As for all other ruling groups, it is imperative for them to convert power into authority and legitimacy. Only in so doing can they ensure their sustenance and survival. In the early stages of their tenure, South Asian military regimes sought legitimacy through the propagation of their self-image as a set of missionary, progressive, neutral and patriotic guardians of the nation. However, the popular will expected performance rather than platitudes. Aware that military solutions to social problems are counter-productive, and guided by practical common sense, South Asian military regimes, like their counterparts elsewhere, have sought “creative relationships with civilian political groups .†1 But such exercises are also expedient as they bring about a cosmetic “civilianisation†of what is essentially a military administration. This mixture of common sense and opportunism has, usually in combination, generated six strategies for the sustenance and survival of South Asian military regimes; co-option of civilians into the government, intimidation of political opponents, divide et empera, expansion of political participation, constitutional legitimation and populism. This paper would attempt to analyze as to how and why these strategies succeeded in fortifying the regimes of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Ziaur Rahman .