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Smaller Businesses and Relationship Banking: The Impact of Participative Behavior

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  • Martin R. Binks
  • Christine T. Ennew

Abstract

Although the venture capital industry is undoubtedly of Importance, the majority of finance to smaller businesses continues to be provided by the banking sector. The provision of finance to these businesses is generally thought to be characterized by Information asymmetries, which are likely to lead to some form of credit rationing. To the extent that credit rationing occurs, viable enterprise may be lost. While collateral is commonly cited as a means of counteracting the information asymmetries that lead to credit rationing, an alternative mechanism is to improve the flow of information between business and bank. This is most commonly achieved through the development of a close working relationship. The success of such a relationship depends upon the willingness of both parties to involve themselves with each other and work together. This paper examines the nature of the banking relationship, paying particular attention to the idea of relationship participation and the benefits that accrue to both parties as a result of participation. Using data from over 3000 UK small firms, It is possible to identify four broad relationship types based on the degree to which the bank and the business participate in the relationship. A comparison across different relationship types suggests that there are considerable benefits associated with more participative relationships.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin R. Binks & Christine T. Ennew, 1997. "Smaller Businesses and Relationship Banking: The Impact of Participative Behavior," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 21(4), pages 83-92, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:entthe:v:21:y:1997:i:4:p:83-92
    DOI: 10.1177/104225879702100406
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bosse, Douglas A., 2009. "Bundling governance mechanisms to efficiently organize small firm loans," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 183-195, March.
    2. Anirban Sengupta, 2011. "Network Strategy and Access to Business Finance," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Emerging Economies, Entrepreneurship Development Institute of India, vol. 20(1), pages 103-126, March.
    3. Sara Jonsson & Jessica Lindbergh, 2013. "The Development of Social Capital and Financing of Entrepreneurial Firms: From Financial Bootstrapping to Bank Funding," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 37(4), pages 661-686, July.
    4. Patrick Saparito & Amanda Elam & Candida Brush, 2013. "Bank–Firm Relationships: Do Perceptions Vary by Gender?," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 37(4), pages 837-858, July.

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