IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/enejou/v12y1991i2p153-164.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Capacity Rationing and Fixed Cost Collection

Author

Listed:
  • Chi-Keung Woo

Abstract

This paper proposes a simple load management program with a two-part tariff to ration an electric utility’s installed capacity and to collect its fixed costs under asymmetric information and demand uncertainty. Because of its simplicity, the program is a practical alternative to spot pricing and rationing schemes with highly nonlinear rate structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Chi-Keung Woo, 1991. "Capacity Rationing and Fixed Cost Collection," The Energy Journal, , vol. 12(2), pages 153-164, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:12:y:1991:i:2:p:153-164
    DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol12-No2-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol12-No2-9
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol12-No2-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel F. Spulber, 1989. "Regulation and Markets," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262192756, December.
    2. Schwarz, Peter M & Taylor, Thomas N, 1987. "Public Utility Pricing under Risk; the Case of Self-Rationing: Comment and Extension," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 734-739, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Carlo Cambini & Yossi Spiegel, 2016. "Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 487-515, April.
    2. Cherry, Barbara A., 2014. "Historical mutilation: How misuse of 'public utility and 'natural monopoly' misdirects US telecommunications policy development," 20th ITS Biennial Conference, Rio de Janeiro 2014: The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies 106881, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    3. Alvaro Montenegro García, 2007. "Fundamentos de la política de la competencia," Documentos de Economía 3930, Universidad Javeriana - Bogotá.
    4. Torsten Steinrücken & Sebastian Jaenichen, 2009. "Preisregulierung zum Schutz der Verbraucher: Wirkungen auf Werbung und Wohlfahrt," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 78(3), pages 188-201.
    5. Hahn, Robert & Evans, Lewis, 2010. "Regulating Dynamic Markets: Progress in Theory and Practice," Working Paper Series 4052, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    6. Yu-Hong Ai & Di-Yun Peng & Huan-Huan Xiong, 2021. "Impact of Environmental Regulation Intensity on Green Technology Innovation: From the Perspective of Political and Business Connections," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-23, April.
    7. Foreman, R. Dean & Kleit, Andrew N., 2023. "Is prorationing efficiency-enhancing or rent-seeking?: Evidence from a natural experiment," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    8. Elpiniki Bakaouka & Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Walter Ferrarese, 2022. "Endogenous Horizontal Mergers in Homogeneous Goods Industries with Bertrand Competition," DEA Working Papers 96, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.
    9. Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2016. "Tort law under oligopolistic competition," Sciences Po publications 2016-29, Sciences Po.
    10. Martin Gaynor, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 211-255, March.
    11. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nicolas Drouhin, 2020. "A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 95-120, July.
    12. Ming Chang, 1996. "Ramsey pricing in a hierarchical structure with an application to network-access pricing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 281-314, October.
    13. Justus Baron & Daniel F. Spulber, 2018. "Technology Standards and Standard Setting Organizations: Introduction to the Searle Center Database," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 462-503, September.
    14. Bernard, Jean-Thomas & Roland, Michel, 2000. "Load management programs, cross-subsidies and transaction costs: the case of self-rationing," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 161-188, May.
    15. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Competition in or for The Field: Which is Better?," Documentos de Trabajo 115, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    16. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18990 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Beard, T. Randolph & Sweeney, George H. & Gropper, Daniel M., 1995. "Subsidy free pricing of interruptible service contracts," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 53-58, January.
    18. Kumkar, Lars, 1996. "Wettbewerb im Stromsektor der USA II: Re-Regulierung der Einzelhandelsebene im Bundesstaat Kalifornien," Kiel Working Papers 739, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    19. De Vany, A. & Walls, W.D., 1994. "The Law of One Price in a Network: Arbitrage and Price Dynamics in Natural Gas City Gate Markets," Papers 93-94-17, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
    20. Vives, Xavier & Jun, Byoung, 2001. "Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 2899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18968 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19155 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Harford, Jon D, 1998. "The Ultimate Externality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 260-265, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:12:y:1991:i:2:p:153-164. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.