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Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation

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  • Pierre Hausemer

    (London School of Economics, UK)

Abstract

The paper models the consequences of committee report allocation for political representation in the European Parliament (EP). The range of legislators involved in each policy area affects the values, interests and constituencies that the Parliament represents. Thus, representation is defined as an MEP’s participation in salient policy areas. The allocation of salient reports follows inter-and intra-party group dynamics. First, party groups compete for salient reports in a context of open voting rules in committee and plenum. Second, group coordinators distribute these reports among their MEPs in an attempt to maximize the cohesion of the group. The model is tested on data from the fifth European Parliament (1999-2002). The results confirm the impact of selective participation on political representation. The EP has evolved into a ‘normal’ Parliament featuring coalitions and competition along a left-right cleavage across party groups and a hierarchical allocation of legislative spoils within parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Hausemer, 2006. "Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation," European Union Politics, , vol. 7(4), pages 505-530, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:7:y:2006:i:4:p:505-530
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116506069441
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. William T. Daniel, 2013. "When the Agent Knows Better than the Principal: The Effect of Education and Seniority on European Parliament Rapporteur Assignment," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 832-848, September.

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