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The Second-order Election Model in an Enlarged Europe

Author

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  • Jason R. Koepke

    (University of Pittsburgh, USA)

  • Nils Ringe

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA)

Abstract

On 1 May 2004, the European Union (EU) welcomed its new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. This paper considers to what extent one of the most widely tested and supported theories of voting behavior in Western Europe, the second-order election model, applies in the enlarged EU. We test the model using election data from the new member states and find that voters do not cast protest votes against their incumbent national governments in second-order elec tions, that is, elections where voters believe little to be at stake. This finding contradicts one of the model's basic propositions and runs counter to the empirical reality in the old member states, with potentially significant implications for inter and intra-institutional politics in the EU.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason R. Koepke & Nils Ringe, 2006. "The Second-order Election Model in an Enlarged Europe," European Union Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 321-346, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:321-346
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116506066259
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alvarez, R. Michael & Nagler, Jonathan, 2000. "A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 57-75, January.
    2. Kernell, Samuel, 1977. "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 44-66, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Meijers, Maurits & Rauh, Christian, 2016. "Has eurosceptic mobilization become more contagious? Comparing the 2009 and 2014 EP election campaigns in the Netherlands and France," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 4(1), pages 83-103.
    2. Laura Caroli & Nicola Genga & Alvaro Imbernon & Iulian Stanescu, 2014. "Towards a new European polity? Social democrats and the 2014 ep elections," Journal of Community Positive Practices, Catalactica NGO, issue 2, pages 81-114.
    3. Hermann Schmitt & Ilke Toygür, 2016. "European Parliament Elections of May 2014: Driven by National Politics or EU Policy Making?," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 4(1), pages 167-181.
    4. Maurits Meijers & Christian Rauh, 2016. "Has Eurosceptic Mobilization Become More Contagious? Comparing the 2009 and 2014 EP Election Campaigns in The Netherlands and France," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 4(1), pages 83-103.
    5. Nicholas Clark, 2015. "The Federalist Perspective in Elections to the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 524-541, May.
    6. Hajo G. Boomgaarden & David Johann & Sylvia Kritzinger, 2016. "Voting at National versus European Elections: An Individual Level Test of the Second Order Paradigm for the 2014 European Parliament Elections," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 4(1), pages 130-144.

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