IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ecolab/v17y2007i2p11-35.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

If Corporate Governance is the Answer, What is the Question? The Illusory Relation between Structural Solutions and Japanese Deflation

Author

Listed:
  • Craig Freedman
  • Alex Blair

Abstract

Policy by assertion is an all too common temptation amongst economic analysts. Plausible stories substitute for closely developed economic theory backed by convincing empirical evidence. In the case of Japan, an extended period of deflation attracted numerous proposed policy responses. Structural explanations, typified by those relating to corporate governance, appear to be uncontroversial. On closer examination however, the causative mechanisms and actual evidence turn out to be seriously lacking. Instead, a collection of individually desirable objectives are bundled together to present an appearance, rather than a reality, of cause and effect. The result is a set of obvious solutions, but the associated policies remain largely dependent on assertion for their authority.

Suggested Citation

  • Craig Freedman & Alex Blair, 2007. "If Corporate Governance is the Answer, What is the Question? The Illusory Relation between Structural Solutions and Japanese Deflation," The Economic and Labour Relations Review, , vol. 17(2), pages 11-35, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ecolab:v:17:y:2007:i:2:p:11-35
    DOI: 10.1177/103530460701700202
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/103530460701700202
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/103530460701700202?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barla, Philippe & Koo, Bonchun, 1999. "Bankruptcy protection and pricing strategies in the US airline industry," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 101-120, June.
    2. Kaplan, Steven N. & Minton, Bernadette A., 1994. "Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 225-258, October.
    3. Norman Cameron & Derek Hum & Wayne Simpson, 1996. "Stylized Facts and Stylized Illusions: Inflation and Productivity Revisited," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(1), pages 152-162, February.
    4. Luke Nottage, 2006. "Nothing new in the (North) East? Interpreting the Rhetoric and Reality of Japanese Corporate Governance," Asia Pacific Economic Papers 359, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    5. Richard A. Werner, 2005. "New Paradigm in Macroeconomics," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-50607-7.
    6. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 510-546, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bok Baik & Wooseok Choi, 2010. "Managing Earnings Surprises in Japan: Perspectives from Main Bank Relationships and Institutional Ownership," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(5‐6), pages 495-517, June.
    2. Kato, Takao, 1997. "Chief executive compensation and corporate groups in Japan: New evidence from micro data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 455-467, July.
    3. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from New Micro Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1914, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Ahn, Sanghoon & Bhattacharya, Utpal & Jung, Taehun & Nam, Giseok, 2009. "Do Japanese CEOs matter?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 628-650, November.
    5. Hoshi, Takeo & Koibuchi, Satoshi & Schaede, Ulrike, 2018. "The decline in bank-led corporate restructuring in Japan: 1981-2010," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 81-90.
    6. Mariassunta Giannetti & Andrei Simonov, 2013. "On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro Evidence from Japan," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 135-167, January.
    7. Kentaro Koga & Satomi Uchino, 2012. "Bank-Firm Relationships and Security Analyst Activities: Evidence from Japan," The Japanese Accounting Review, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, vol. 2, pages 49-73, December.
    8. Tomoaki Sakano & Arie Y. Lewin, 1999. "Impact of CEO Succession in Japanese Companies: A Coevolutionary Perspective," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(5), pages 654-671, October.
    9. Chen, Carl R. & Guo, Weiyu & Mande, Vivek, 2003. "Managerial ownership and firm valuation: Evidence from Japanese firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 267-283, July.
    10. Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin, 2001. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 943-977.
    11. Xu, Peng, 1997. "Executive Salaries as Tournament Prizes and Executive Bonuses as Managerial Incentives in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 319-346, September.
    12. Sinha, Rajeeva, 2006. "Regulation: The market for corporate control and corporate governance," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 264-282, March.
    13. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    14. Naohito Abe & Taehun Jung, 2004. "Cross-Shareholdings, Outside Directors, and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Japan," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d04-38, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    15. Volpin, Paolo F., 2002. "Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-90, April.
    16. Ricardo N. Bebczuk & André L. Carvalhal da Silva & Alberto E. Chong & Juan José Cruces & Urbi Garay & Maximiliano González & Luis H. Gutiérrez & Enrique Kawamura & Ricardo P. C. Leal & Fernando Lefort, 2007. "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Firm-level Evidence across Latin America," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 59598 edited by Alberto E. Chong & Florencio López-de-Silanes, February.
    17. Giorgio Brunello & Clara Graziano & Bruno Parigi, 1999. "Ownership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?," Working Papers 1999.30, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    18. Nenova, Tatiana, 2006. "Takeover laws and financial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4029, The World Bank.
    19. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    20. Azzam Islam, 2010. "Bank Ownership and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Egypt," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 5(3), pages 91-118, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ecolab:v:17:y:2007:i:2:p:11-35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.