A Non-nuclear US Ally’s Nuclear Option: South Korea’s Case

North Korea’s nuclear armament has placed South Korea in a dilemma, as it can neither rely entirely on the United States’ nuclear extended deterrence (NED) nor pursue its own nuclear weapons development (the nuclear option). The reliability of the US NED has diminished, given North Korea’s ability to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the US mainland. However, pursuing the nuclear option is fraught with difficulties due to the stringent restrictions imposed by the international non-proliferation regime. This article evaluates the feasibility of South Korea’s nuclear option using three factors: opportunity, willingness and the availability of special nuclear materials. The findings suggest that the feasibility of South Korea’s nuclear option is very low. Consequently, the article advises the South Korean public to acknowledge this reality rather than making emotional demands for the nuclear option. Furthermore, it calls upon the international community to engage in discussions and address the dilemma faced by non-nuclear US allies, such as South Korea, in light of the growing threat of nuclear attacks from nuclear-armed states like Russia and North Korea.