Limits of India–US Relations: Balancing Through Strategic Autonomy and Multi-alignment

The India–US relationship has often been described as a defining partnership. But the nature of the friendship in actuality is yet to assume depth. Despite convergences at multiple levels, it falls short of a true strategic partnership or deep friendship. The India–US relationship is neither a trusted nor an assured economic or security partnership. It is often tested by the vagaries of real-time issues, especially involving other great powers. That is why, despite signing the civilian nuclear deal, foundational agreements, being members of the Quad and Indo-Pacific Economic Forum, and with the common objective of containing the rise of China, they are unable to work closely together on myriad bilateral, international and regional issues. There are differences over matters of primary interests and the type of partnership that each wants to establish. The United States was insensitive to Indian concerns in its abrupt drawdown from Afghanistan in 2021, sub-continental security threats emanating from the China–Pakistan axis and its continued military support to Pakistan. India’s neutral stand (read in the United States as being pro-Russian) in the Ukraine crisis marked by its abstention from voting against Russia in the UN and purchase of Russian oil despite strong objections from the US-led Western camp are cases in point. We argue that India’s US policy is a case of limited balancing dictated by compulsions and lacks depth. For rising India, a continued desire for strategic autonomy and multi-alignment—the post-non-alignment foreign policy principles—guides its foreign policy orientation. For Washington, a deeper relationship would imply India abandoning its visions of strategic autonomy and joining more formally in Washington’s orbit. These core national objectives of the two countries limit the level of partnership they can forge.