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Money, Benefits, and Power

Author

Listed:
  • Ryan A. Smith

Abstract

This article explores the manner in which race, ethnicity, and gender intersect to produce inequality in wages and employer benefits among “workers†(employees with no job authority), “supervisors†(employees with broad supervisory responsibilities), and “managers†(employees who can hire/fire and set the pay of others). Using data uniquely suited to examine these relationships, the author finds that, contrary to the glass ceiling hypothesis, the white male advantage over women and minorities in wages and retirement benefits generally does not increase with movement up the authority hierarchy net of controls. Instead, relative inequality remains constant at higher and lower levels of authority. However, in nontraditional work settings where white men report to minority and female supervisors, there is evidence that a glass ceiling stifles women and minorities while a glass escalator helps white men. Instead of representing mutually exclusive processes and outcomes, glass ceilings and glass escalators may actually overlap in certain employment contexts. The implications of these results for future analyses of workplace inequality are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan A. Smith, 2012. "Money, Benefits, and Power," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 639(1), pages 149-172, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:anname:v:639:y:2012:i:1:p:149-172
    DOI: 10.1177/0002716211422038
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