The Political-Structural Basis for Economic Performance

Focusing on France, Great Britain, Sweden, and the United States, this study attempts to answer two basic questions. First, how does one explain the variation across these countries in the organizational structure and the power of the working class? Second, for the period since 1950 how does variation in the organizational structure, the power of the working class, and the structure of the state influence such economic performances as inequality in the distribution of income and rates of change in economic productivity? Whereas the discipline of economics generally explains these performances with economic variables, this article is distinctive in demonstrating that political variables are also important. The findings indicate that the encompassing group structure of Swedish labor unions has maximized equality in income distribution and high rates of change in economic productivity while the fragmented and nonencompassing group structure of American labor has had the opposite effect. Sweden and the United States are polar opposites, with the British and French cases falling between the two extremes on most variables.