Where We Stand

If the Soviet Union, with its burgeoning mili tary presence, is in the Middle East to stay, so also is the United States. Its basic interests in the area are deeply rooted and are met by the desire of most states to retain a defense or economic tie with us. Our interests center in the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) south east wing and consequently in our allies of the Northern Tier—Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Of these three countries, Turkey is the rock on which all else depends. Its defense requirements, which cannot be sustained by its own infant industries, are now being neglected by the United States, while those of Greece are being opposed by irresponsible pressure in American political circles. An Arab-Israel settle ment, which would immensely serve NATO security require ments, continues to elude us, again largely owing to domestic political pressures against the well-grounded Rogers Plan, bringing dangers of further polarization of key Arab states against us. An outright alliance of the United States with Israel, which might be indicated to military planners by the latter's demonstrated prowess in arms, would not serve Ameri ca's or NATO's security purposes, since Israel's forces are de ployed against Arab states with whom it is not in our interests to be hostile. With or without an abatement of the Arab-Israel quarrel, the United States should quietly develop educational, technological, and investment links with various Arab states, especially of the Maghrib and the Gulf, where Soviet assistance is by no means adequate to meet the degree and quality of local demand for modernization and development.