Should the United States Retain a Military Presence in Europe and Asia?

For much of the twentieth century, the United States has sought to prevent hostile powers from gaining ascend ancy in Europe and the Pacific Basin because the security of these regions was deemed vital to her security. Several con straints now limit U.S. influence in Europe and Asia: (1) the changed strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union in which, under conditions of nuclear parity, the stakes for which the United States would risk its own destruc tion for defense of overseas commitments increase; (2) the willingness of U.S. elites and public opinion to continue to support large-scale conventional forces abroad is reduced; and (3) the international system has evolved toward a limited multipolarity with the emergence of potential new power centers in Europe and Asia. The formidable task facing the United States over the next decade is to maintain sufficient forces abroad to safeguard its interests and to preserve the residual linkage between U.S. strategic deterrence and local security in Europe and Asia, while encouraging the development of power centers less de pendent upon her for their security. The immediate and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces, especially from Europe, would render difficult, if not impossible, the achievement of such goals.