Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis

Alliance with Soviet Russia has served the mili tary, economic, and political interests of Communist China. The dependency of Peking upon Moscow during the Stalin period compelled suppression of ideological differences on the part of Mao Tse-tung. Growing Chinese strength, however, afforded increased leverage upon the post-Stalin leadership. In 1956, the East European crisis prompted Peking to inter vene in bloc affairs, promoting a formula which varied from the approach of Moscow. This formula called for relegation of bloc differences to secret bilateral discussions as well as for toleration of greater divergence in the domestic practices of bloc regimes. Chinese mediation between the Polish and Russian positions during 1956-57 appeared to smooth bloc relations throughout East Europe. Abandonment of this formula at the November 1957 con ference in Moscow coincided with a major shift by Mao Tse- tung on other aspects of Chinese foreign policy. This shift paralleled preconference signs from Khrushchev of a harsher line both on bloc affairs and toward the non-Communist world. Overtly the Sino-Soviet attack against "revisionism" applied to the Yugoslavs. Gomulka's position at the conference, how ever, as well as during the 1958 attack on Tito, suggested that Poland also felt pressure from the new line. The change in Peking's policy from 1956 to 1957 may have come from a reappraisal of Soviet strength resulting from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and artificial satellite developments in the latter half of 1957. Such a reappraisal may explain the new harshness of Chinese foreign policy statements directed not only within the bloc but to other areas as well.