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Rice, Salmon or Sushi? Political Competition for Supply of a Regulated Input

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  • Leo H. Kahane

Abstract

This paper describes a simple theoretical model of competing interest groups and uses a modified Cournot model with endogenous policy. The focus is on how different assumptions over internal lobby group organization affect the outcome of lobby competition. The results of the paper formalize some of the basic tenets and propositions contained in Olson's (1965) The Logic of Collective Action and provides a more explicit, game-theoretic structure for examining issues raised by Becker in his (1983) paper A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.

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  • Leo H. Kahane, 2002. "Rice, Salmon or Sushi? Political Competition for Supply of a Regulated Input," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 46(1), pages 22-28, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:amerec:v:46:y:2002:i:1:p:22-28
    DOI: 10.1177/056943450204600103
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-1534, November.
    2. repec:bla:kyklos:v:36:y:1983:i:3:p:469-81 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1983. "Some Aspects of the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 469-481, August.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    5. Hal R. Varian, 1989. "Measuring The Deadweight Costs Of Dup And Rent Seeking Activities," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 81-95, March.
    6. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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