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Theoretical Aspects Of The Role Of Information In The Process Of Decisions/Risks Modeling

Author

Listed:
  • Constantin ANGHELACHE

    (Bucharest University of Economic Studies/„Artifex" University of Bucharest)

  • Madalina-Gabriela ANGHEL

    („Artifex" University of Bucharest)

  • Gyorgy BODO

    (Bucharest University of Economic Studies)

Abstract

Access to information is a key element in the decision-making process. Intuitively, it can be assumed that the decision will be more substantiated and based more on rational than on subjective ones as long as the decision maker has more information. In this article, we analyzed some theoretical aspects of the correlation between information level and modeling of decisional risk. They address the importance of information in decision-making (information is power), the determination of the degree of uncertainty and the outcome of the decision, as well as the main objective of modeling, maximizing benefits. Different aspects of access to information have also been taken into account, cases known as asymmetric information, where some participants have access to more information than the main effects. We have also analyzed the cost implications of information by which some agents buy information to be in a competitive position, or invest heavily in IT systems for collecting, storing, processing data. Last but not least, we have considered some aspects of the impact of information in the development of macroeconomic forecasts.

Suggested Citation

  • Constantin ANGHELACHE & Madalina-Gabriela ANGHEL & Gyorgy BODO, 2017. "Theoretical Aspects Of The Role Of Information In The Process Of Decisions/Risks Modeling," Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, vol. 65(6), pages 102-111, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:rsr:supplm:v:65:y:2017:i:6:p:102-111
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Constantin ANGHELACHE & Mirela PANAIT & Andreea - Ioana MARINESCU & Georgiana NITA, 2017. "Models and indicators used in macroeconomic forecast," Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, vol. 65(3), pages 40-48, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Constantin ANGHELACHE & Marian SFETCU & Gyorgy BODO, 2017. "Analysis Of Banking Risks In The Context Of The Basel Agreements," Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, vol. 65(12), pages 83-89, December.
    2. Madalina-Gabriela ANGHEL & Marian SFETCU & Gyorgy BODO & Doina BUREA, 2017. "Bank Risk Management," Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, vol. 65(11), pages 87-94, November.
    3. Constantin Anghelache & Gyorgy Bodo, 2018. "General Methods of Management the Credit Risk," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 8(1), pages 143-152, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    decision; information; modeling; simulation; probability; utility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G17 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Financial Forecasting and Simulation
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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