Model for Social Insurance with Definite Benefits and Test of Contributions

The evidence of the contribution’s base is realized in a national information system only since April 2001. Previous to this period is the “contest” of certificates which prove incomes not registered in employment records. This competition depends at the level of each person on the keeping of records, the “will”former employer to mention supplementary incomes, the “skill” of the employer in issuing correct, clear or ambiguous certificates. “Unclear” certificates generate labor conflicts, and on their interpretation, the final result of the beneficiary depends. Accidental factors that generate erroneous pensions and repeated revision of decisions, or even the establishment of debts on behalf of the pensioners are a real problem of the system. Two or more persons who have the same annual points, therefore equal pensions, can actually have different salary profiles. The sum of annual points can result from a wide range of combinations. Te test of contributions will place the persons with different salary profiles in the position of obtaining different pensions. Due to these aspects, in the present paper the authors propose a model supposed to avoid these shortcomings.