Author
Listed:
- Mark S. Gallagher
- Daniel S. Fenn
- Shane N. Hall
Abstract
Many large organizations have risk that propagates because of the dependencies between their various major organizational components. This paper addresses when cycles of dependencies exist in an organization or system of systems. In a 2016 article, Gallagher, MacKenzie, Blum and Boerman proposed determining component risk assessment by evaluating against future plans with respect to performance, cost and schedules. Their method aggregated various risk evaluations to an expected component risk assessment between zero and one for each future scenario. In 2020, Hall, Gallagher and Fenn presented a networked risk assessment framework that evaluates components’ risks to assess the networked risk by components and the overall organizational expected risk. They included describing a maximum likelihood method to estimate dependencies between components based on expert assessments. They also proposed three risk propagation approaches across the networked components to produce networked risk assessments: (1) the linear program approach, which transfers risk based only on the worst support; (2) the reliability approach, which uses multiplicative probabilities; and (3) the Leontief approach, which adds all direct and indirect contributing risks. Here, we computationally investigate the sensitivities of those three risk propagation models and conclude the reliability formulation is the most robust to variance in model inputs. We apply this networked risk framework to evaluate the United States Air Force in future combat scenarios.
Suggested Citation
Handle:
RePEc:rsk:journ3:7706881
Download full text from publisher
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rsk:journ3:7706881. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Paine (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.risk.net/journal-of-operational-risk .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.