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Spatial Competition In Illicit Drug Markets: The Consequences Of Increased Drug Law Enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • David W. Rasmussen

    (Florida State University)

  • Bruce L. Benson

    (Florida State University)

  • David L. Sollars

    (Auburn University)

Abstract

This paper explores the impact of increasing drug enforcement on the violent crime rate in the context of spatial competition in illicit drug markets. Violence is an important aspect of competition in illicit markets because disputes cannot be resolved in the courts. A model of spatial competition suggests higher drug enforcement in one jurisdiction will increase the size of the drug market in an adjoining jurisdiction, resulting in a higher violent crime rate. Data from Florida jurisdictions suggest that geographic spillovers of violent crime result from law enforcement differentials and imply that they are much larger than those found in studies of property crime.

Suggested Citation

  • David W. Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson & David L. Sollars, 1993. "Spatial Competition In Illicit Drug Markets: The Consequences Of Increased Drug Law Enforcement," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 23(3), pages 219-236, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:rre:publsh:v23:y:1993:i:3:p:219-236
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tomás E. Murphy & Martín Rossi, 2017. "Following the Poppy Trail: Causes and Consequences of Mexican Drug Cartels," Working Papers 130, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Dec 2017.
    2. Wang, Shoou-Jiun & Batta, Rajan & Rump, Christopher M., 2005. "Stability of a crime level equilibrium," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 229-244, September.
    3. Marcel Fafchamps & Christine Moser, 2003. "Crime, Isolation and Law Enforcement," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 12(4), pages 625-671, December.
    4. Dhaval Dave & Monica Deza & Brady Horn, 2021. "Prescription drug monitoring programs, opioid abuse, and crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(3), pages 808-848, January.
    5. Prieger, James E. & Kulick, Jonathan, 2014. "Unintended consequences of enforcement in illicit markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 295-297.
    6. Miron, Jeffrey A, 2001. "Violence, Guns, and Drugs: A Cross-Country Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 615-633, October.
    7. Germà Bel & Maximilian Holst, 2018. "Assessing the effects of the Mexican Drug War on economic growth: An empirical analysis," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(1), pages 276-303, July.
    8. DeAngelo, Gregory, 2012. "Making space for crime: A spatial analysis of criminal competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 42-51.
    9. Naranjo, Alberto J., 2010. "Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-275, September.
    10. Fauvrelle Thiago A. & Tony C Almeida Alessio, 2018. "Determinants of Judicial Efficiency Change: Evidence from Brazil," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-36, March.
    11. Germá-Bel & Maximilian Holst, 2016. "“A two-Sided coin: Disentangling the economic effects of the 'War on drugs' in Mexico”," IREA Working Papers 201611, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Apr 2016.
    12. Gregory DeAngelo & R. Kaj Gittings & Amanda Ross & Annie Walker, 2016. "Police Bias in the Enforcement of Drug Crimes: Evidence from Low Priority Laws," Working Papers 16-01, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    13. Bruce L. Benson, 2010. "The Allocation of Police," Chapters, in: Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Crime, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Robert Burrus, 1999. "Do efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs increase turf war violence? a theoretical analysis," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 23(3), pages 226-234, September.
    15. Murphy, Tommy E. & Rossi, Martín A., 2020. "Following the poppy trail: Origins and consequences of Mexican drug cartels," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    16. Robert T. Burrus, Jr., 2006. "The Impact of Weight-Based Penalties on Drug Purity and Consumption: A Theoretical Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 629-646, Fall.

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