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Environmental Issues in Public Procurement: How Much Decentralization?

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  • Alessio D'Amato

    (Università di Roma "Tor Vergata")

Abstract

Concerns about the environmental effects of procurement decisions are gaining momentum. We investigate how the environmental quality of public purchases changes under two possible institutional settings: a centralized one, where a single regulator is in charge of both production efficiency and environmental quality, and a decentralized one, where two separate bodies operate, namely an environmental agency securing environmental quality and a procurement agency pursuing efficiency. Informational asymmetries that affect such regulatory relationship are taken into account. We conclude that, under certain conditions, non-cooperation tightens the trade off between incentives to efficiency and rent extraction, resulting in a downward distortion in environmental quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessio D'Amato, 2006. "Environmental Issues in Public Procurement: How Much Decentralization?," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 96(1), pages 209-234, January-F.
    • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:209-234
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Appolloni, Andrea & D'Amato, Alessio & Wenjuan, Cheng, 2011. "Is public procurement going green? experiences and open issues," MPRA Paper 35346, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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