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On Information Sharing and Incentives in R&D

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  • Severinov, Sergei

Abstract

I investigate the issue of endogenous spillover of R&D information across firms through information exchange between their employees. Although the firms typically cannot observe and restrict communication between their employees in a direct way, they can regulate information flows through the incentive schemes offered to the employees. The article focuses on two issues: characterization of the optimal incentive schemes, and the link between the nature of the firms' interaction in the product market and the intensity of information exchange between the employees. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.

Suggested Citation

  • Severinov, Sergei, 2001. "On Information Sharing and Incentives in R&D," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 542-564, Autumn.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:32:y:2001:i:3:p:542-64
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    Cited by:

    1. Kai Zhao, 2015. "Product competition and R&D investment under spillovers within full or partial collusion games," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 24(1), pages 1-27, December.
    2. Xu, Yong & Ji, Junzhe & Li, Nicolas & Borah, Dhruba, 2024. "How do executive excess compensation affect enterprise technological innovation: Evidence from a panel threshold model of chinese biopharmaceutical companies," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    3. Nisvan Erkal & Deborah Minehart, 2007. "Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development," EAG Discussions Papers 200707, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    4. Nisvan Erkal & Deborah Minehart, 2014. "Optimal Technology Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of R&D," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 149-177, March.
    5. Rockett, Katharine, 2010. "Property Rights and Invention," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 315-380, Elsevier.
    6. Nisvan Erkal & Deborah Minehart, 2013. "Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1174, The University of Melbourne.
    7. Hau, Yong Sauk & Kim, Byoungsoo & Lee, Heeseok & Kim, Young-Gul, 2013. "The effects of individual motivations and social capital on employees’ tacit and explicit knowledge sharing intentions," International Journal of Information Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 356-366.

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