Downstream Integration by a Bottleneck Input Supplier Whose Regulated Wholesale Prices Are Above Costs
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Duarte Brito & Pedro Pereira & João Vareda, 2008.
"Incentives to Invest and to Give Access to Non-Regulated Next Generation Networks,"
Working Papers
35, Portuguese Competition Authority.
- Duarte Brito & Pedro Pereira & João Vareda, 2008. "Incentives to Invest and to Give Access to Non-Regulated Next Generation Networks," Working Papers 08-10, NET Institute, revised Oct 2008.
- Fabian Bergès & Claire Chambolle, 2009.
"Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 75(3), pages 353-368.
- Bergès, Fabian & Chambolle, Claire, 2007. "Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power," IDEI Working Papers 471, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Fabian Bergès & Claire Chambolle, 2009. "Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2009033, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Fabian Berges & Claire C. Chambolle, 2009. "Threat of exit as a source of bargaining power [Risque de faillite et pouvoir de marché]," Post-Print hal-02654192, HAL.
- Brito Duarte & Pereira Pedro & Vareda João, 2012. "Does Vertical Separation Necessarily Reduce Quality Discrimination and Increase Welfare?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-44, November.
- Kenneth Fjell & Øystein Foros & Debashis Pal, 2010.
"Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(2), pages 149-162, March.
- Kenneth Fjell & Øystein Foros & Debashis Pal, 2006. "Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing," University of Cincinnati, Economics Working Papers Series 2006-01, University of Cincinnati, Department of Economics.
- Briglauer Wolfgang & Götz Georg & Schwarz Anton, 2011.
"Margin Squeeze in Fixed-Network Telephony Markets -- Competitive or Anticompetitive?,"
Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(4), pages 1-21, December.
- Wolfgang Briglauer & Georg Götz & Anton Schwarz, 2008. "Margin Squeeze in Fixed-Network Telephony Markets – competitive or anticompetitive?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200827, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Jan Bouckaert & Frank Verboven, 2004.
"Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 321-351, August.
- Verboven, Frank & Bouckaert, Jan, 2003. "Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 3824, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- BOUCKAERT, Jan & VERBOVEN, Frank, 2003. "Price squeezes in a regulatory environment," Working Papers 2003007, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
- Brito, Duarte & Pereira, Pedro & Vareda, João, 2012. "Incentives to invest and to give access to non-regulated new technologies," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 197-211.
- Brito, Duarte & Pereira, Pedro, 2009.
"Product differentiation when competing with the suppliers of bottleneck inputs,"
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 43-53, January.
- Duarte Brito & Pedro Pereira, 2007. "Product Differentiation when Competing with the Suppliers of Bottleneck Inputs," Working Papers 25, Portuguese Competition Authority.
- Fernando Coloma & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2009. "Escalamiento de cargos de acceso e incentivos a la predación de un operador de telefonía local integrado verticalmente," Documentos de Trabajo 361, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Silvester Koten, 2013. "Legal unbundling and auctions in vertically integrated (utilities) markets," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 543-573, December.
- Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.
- Roman Inderst & Tommaso Valletti, 2009.
"Price discrimination in input markets,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 1-19, March.
- Roman Inderst & Tommaso Valletti, 2006. "Price Discrimination in Input Markets," CEIS Research Paper 73, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Gaudiny, Germain & Saavedra Valenzuela, Claudia, 2012. "Ex-ante margin squeeze tests in the telecommunications industry: What is a reasonable efficient operator? (Revised: December 20, 2012)," 23rd European Regional ITS Conference, Vienna 2012 67955, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
- Aldo González Tissinetti, 2006. "Antitrust and Regulation, Complements or Substitutes? The Case of a Vertically Integrated Firm," Working Papers wp225, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
- Brito, Duarte & Pereira, Pedro & Vareda, João, 2010.
"Can two-part tariffs promote efficient investment on next generation networks?,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 323-333, May.
- Duarte Brito & Pedro Pereira & João Vareda, 2008. "Can Two-Part Tariffs Promote Efficient Investment on Next Generation Networks?," Working Papers 34, Portuguese Competition Authority.
- Gaudin, Germain & Saavedra, Claudia, 2014.
"Ex ante margin squeeze tests in the telecommunications industry: What is a reasonably efficient operator?,"
Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 157-172.
- Germain Gaudin & Claudia Saavedra, 2014. "Ex ante margin squeeze tests in the telecommunications industry: What is a reasonably efficient operator?," Post-Print hal-02410469, HAL.
- Galetovic Alexander & Sanhueza Ricardo, 2009. "Vertical Mergers and Competition with a Regulated Bottleneck Monopoly," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-20, October.
- Øystein Foros & Hans Kind & Lars Sørgard, 2007. "Managerial incentives and access price regulation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 117-133, April.
- Arya, Anil & Mittendorf, Brian & Sappington, David E.M., 2008. "Outsourcing, vertical integration, and price vs. quantity competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-16, January.
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