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The Law of One Price and a Theory of the Firm

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  • Shailendra Raj Mehta

Abstract

I use a hierarchical perspective to explain the pattern of interindustry wages and capital intensities. Industries that have more productive technologies pay more than less-productive ones, and are more capital intensive as well. Results on size of the hierarchy, effort levels, and span of control are presented as well. The key insight is that supervisors both monitor and coordinate their subordinates, and time spent on one of these activities reduces the time available for the other. Several stylized facts are explained thereby.

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  • Shailendra Raj Mehta, 1998. "The Law of One Price and a Theory of the Firm," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 137-156, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:spring:p:137-156
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    1. repec:zbw:ifwedp:201242 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Joao Ricardo Faria, 1998. "Supervision and Effort in an Intertemporal Efficiency Wage Model: The Role of the Solow Condition," Studies in Economics 9814, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    3. Yongjin Wang & Laixun Zhao, 2013. "Saving Good Jobs under Global Competition by Rewarding Quality and Efforts," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-17, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised May 2013.
    4. Henri L.F. de Groot & Anton B.T.M. van Schaik, 2002. "Unemployment, Growth and the Organisation of Work," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-017/3, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. M. Diaz & Rosario Sanchez, 2008. "Firm size and productivity in Spain: a stochastic frontier analysis," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 315-323, March.
    6. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1999. "Low-powered incentives," Working Papers 1999-005, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    7. Joao Ricardo Faria, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of the Peter and Dilbert Principles," Working Paper Series 101, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
    8. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Ronny Razin, 2004. "Curb Your Innovation: Corporate Conservatism in the Presence of Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000194, David K. Levine.
    9. Davis, Donald R. & Harrigan, James, 2011. "Good jobs, bad jobs, and trade liberalization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 26-36, May.
    10. João Ricardo Faria & Franklin G. Mixon, 2020. "The Peter and Dilbert Principles applied to academe," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 115-132, June.
    11. Michael J. Hicks, 2007. "Hierarchical delays as a source of nominal price rigidities: evidence from the microcomputer industry," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(7), pages 803-815.
    12. Michael T. Rauh, 2020. "The Neoclassical Firm Under Moral Hazard," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 191-225, June.
    13. Faria, Joao Ricardo, 2000. "Supervision and effort in an intertemporal efficiency wage model: the role of the Solow condition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 93-98, April.
    14. Wang, Yongjin & Zhao, Laixun, 2015. "Saving good jobs from global competition by rewarding quality and efforts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 426-434.
    15. Samuel G. Berlinski, 2000. "Contracting-out and the Interindustry Wage Structure: Do Norms of Internal Equity Matter in Wage Determination?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1053, Econometric Society.

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