IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rje/randje/v15y1984ispringp127-134.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Socially Optimal Pricing with Rivalry and Economies of Scale

Author

Listed:
  • Ronald R. Braeutigam

Abstract

This article examines the nature of economically efficient tariffs when there exists rivalry among firms that produce imperfectly substitutable outputs with economies of scale and that operate under a viability constraint. Pricing principles are derived and related to the rules developed in the literature for the regulated monopolist. For some firms excess profits may prevail at efficient prices, and the form of the inverse elasticity rule is altered in markets with rivalry. However, the standard efficient pricing rules and increased welfare results if regulators are empowered to implement lump-sum interfirm payments. A numerical example is provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald R. Braeutigam, 1984. "Socially Optimal Pricing with Rivalry and Economies of Scale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 127-134, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:spring:p:127-134
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28198421%2915%3A1%3C127%3ASOPWRA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Patricia Danzon & Adrian Towse & Jorge Mestre‐Ferrandiz, 2015. "Value‐Based Differential Pricing: Efficient Prices for Drugs in a Global Context," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(3), pages 294-301, March.
    2. Alberto Cassone & Carla Marchese, 2005. "Welfare Effects of Price Integration in Local Public Transport," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(2), pages 257-274, June.
    3. William C. Miller, 2007. "Ramsey pricing with long run competition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(34), pages 1-5.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:34:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kessides, Ioannis N. & Willig, Robert D., 1995. "Restructuring regulation of the rail industry for the public interest," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1506, The World Bank.
    6. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    7. Deb, Kaushik & Filippini, Massimo, 2011. "Estimating welfare changes from efficient pricing in public bus transit in India," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 23-31, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:spring:p:127-134. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.rje.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.