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Cash and Share Renting: An Empirical Test of the Link Between Entrepreneurial Ability and Contractual Choice

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  • D.J. Brown
  • J.H. Atkinson

Abstract

Why do rent, wage, and sharecropping contracts exist simultaneously? One possibility is that contract types distinguish between workers with different endowments of managerial ability. This article describes an empirical test of the link between managerial ability and contract choice.

Suggested Citation

  • D.J. Brown & J.H. Atkinson, 1981. "Cash and Share Renting: An Empirical Test of the Link Between Entrepreneurial Ability and Contractual Choice," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 296-299, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:12:y:1981:i:spring:p:296-299
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    Cited by:

    1. Bierlen, Ralph W. & Parsch, Lucas D. & Dixon, Bruce L., 1999. "How Cropland Contract Type And Term Decisions Are Made: Evidence From An Arkansas Tenant Survey," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-19.
    2. Moss, Leeann E. & Westgren, Randall E. & Schnitkey, Gary D. & Barry, Peter J., 2001. "A Transation Cost Economics And Property Rights Theory Approach To Farmland Lease Preferences," 2001 Regional Committee NC-221, October 1-2, 2001, McLean, Virginia 132406, Regional Research Committee NC-1014: Agricultural and Rural Finance Markets in Transition.
    3. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1998. "Renegotiation-proof tenurial contracts as screening mechanisms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, June.

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