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CEO Pension and Auditors Going Concern Opinion

Author

Listed:
  • Kyung Jin, Park

    (Myongji University)

  • Mo, Kyoungwon

    (Chung-Ang University)

  • Yoon, Nayoung

    (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology)

Abstract

In U.S., CEO pension is common and sizable compensation recorded as off - balance sheet liabilities before CEOs’ retirement . Also, since it becomes unplayable after bankruptcy, CEOs awarded with pension plans are known to manage their firms conservatively to prevent such bankruptcies. Therefore, it was empirically examine d how auditors consider CEO pension in determining their going - concern opinions. O ur empirical results indicate that auditors are more likely to issue nega tive going - concern opinions for firms that provide their CEOs with pension plans. The results remain robust after controlling various endogeneity issues. Overall, our findings impl y that auditors recognize CEO pensions as liabilities rather than significan tly consider how CEO pensions provide incentives for conservative firm management .

Suggested Citation

  • Kyung Jin, Park & Mo, Kyoungwon & Yoon, Nayoung, 2018. "CEO Pension and Auditors Going Concern Opinion," International Journal of Entrepreneurship, Allied Business Academies, vol. 22(4), January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:ijentr:0071
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inside Debt; CEO Pension; Audit Opinion; Going-Concern Opinion.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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