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CEO Pension and Selling, General and Administrative Cost Stickiness

Author

Listed:
  • Mo, Kyoungwon

    (Chung-Ang University)

  • Park, Kyung Jin

    (Myongji University)

  • YoungJin, Kim

    (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology)

Abstract

Using CEO pension as inside debt, we show how inside debt affects cost stickiness. Inside debt was recently recognized as debt-based compensation that increases managers’ risk aversion. More risk adverse managers will reduce cost stickiness if it suits their self-interest. We empirically find that inside debt decreases cost stickiness, which implies that cost stickiness is mainly driven by overconfident CEOs’ intentions to benefit them. Our results show that inside debt can mitigate the agency problem in cost stickiness.

Suggested Citation

  • Mo, Kyoungwon & Park, Kyung Jin & YoungJin, Kim, 2018. "CEO Pension and Selling, General and Administrative Cost Stickiness," International Journal of Entrepreneurship, Allied Business Academies, vol. 22(4), May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:ijentr:0070
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO Pension; Cost stickiness; Agency problem; Inside Debt.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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