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Collective Evolution of Turn-taking Norm in Repeated Dispersion Games

Author

Listed:
  • Namatame, Akira

    (National Defense Academy, Yokosuka)

  • Fujii (Tanoura), Noriko

    (National Defense Academy, Yokosuka)

Abstract

Using a game-theoretic model combined with the evolutionary model, we investigate the conditions under which desirable norms will emerge in various social interaction settings. Human beings appear to easily recognize the importance of a coordinated turn-taking behaviour as a mean to realize a fair outcome. We show turn-taking norm or alternating reciprocity emerge among networked agents who play dispersion games. We also investigate the co-evolutionary dynamics of networked agents in different network topologies and discuss the effects of the network topologies on evolution of such desirable norm. We show the symmetric local network under which each agent play with the same number of the closest neighbours fosters to emerge such desirable turn-taking norm.

Suggested Citation

  • Namatame, Akira & Fujii (Tanoura), Noriko, 2008. "Collective Evolution of Turn-taking Norm in Repeated Dispersion Games," European Journal of Economic and Social Systems, Lavoisier, vol. 21(1), pages 83-105.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:ejessy:0076
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dispersion game; turn-taking; alternating reciprocity; social norms; social networks; rule evolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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