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Do Sharecroppers Undersupply Effort? Evidence from a Farm Level Survey in Assam Plains

Author

Listed:
  • GOSWAMI , BINOY

    (Assistant Professor, Department of Economics)

  • BEZBARUAH, M. P.

    (Professor of Economics)

Abstract

Using farm level data from Assam plains in Northeast India generated through a primary survey, this paper revisits the debate dating back to Alfred Marshall which centers on the question whether the sharecroppers undersupply effort in crop production as reflected in their input intensities. Our investigation, however, did not result in a categorical answer to the research question. It has been found that while the sharecroppers undersupply labour input conforming the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis, tenancy or any of its forms does not have any significant impact on capital intensity. On the other hand, in the case of fertiliser consumption it has been found that the fixed rent tenants tend to apply chemical fertilisers more intensively than even the owner operators. This was not reported in the existing literature which has an adverse implication for the sustainable use of land. The tendency among the fixed rent tenants to apply more chemical fertilisers is outcomes of certain restrictive provisions in the existing tenancy law in the state. Accordingly, the paper suggests reforms in the existing tenancy law in order to overcome these problems and ensure efficient utilisation of land resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Goswami , Binoy & Bezbaruah, M. P., 2013. "Do Sharecroppers Undersupply Effort? Evidence from a Farm Level Survey in Assam Plains," Bangladesh Development Studies, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), vol. 36(2), pages 43-76, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:badest:0555
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shaban, Radwan Ali, 1987. "Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 893-920, October.
    2. Gautam, H.C., 1995. "Agrarian Relations: A Study on Some Aspects of Land Tenancy System in Assam," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 50(4).
    3. Lanjouw, Peter & Stern, Nicholas, 1998. "Economic Development in Palanpur over Five Decades," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288329.
    4. D. Gale Johnson, 1950. "Resource Allocation under Share Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 111-111.
    5. Dobbs, Thomas & Foster, Phillips, 1972. "Incentives to Invest in New Agricultural Inputs in North India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 101-117, October.
    6. Kuri, Pravat Kumar, 2003. "Factor Market Imperfections and Explanations of Tenancy: Testing of an Econometric Model Using Evidence from Assam of North-East India," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 58(2), June.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Bidisha, Sayema Haque & Hossain, Md. Amzad & Alam, Rubaiyat & Hasan, Md. Mehedi, 2018. "Credit, tenancy choice and agricultural efficiency: Evidence from the northern region of Bangladesh," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 22-32.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tenancy; Sharecropping; Fixed Rent; Input Intensities; Inefficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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