Una aproximación a los flujos interterritoriales ocultos derivados de la ejecución de obra pública financiada por el Estado en las Comunidades Autónomas. El caso de Galicia 2015-2012

Resumen:El gasto público y de forma especial las inversiones en infraestructuras, tienen un efecto directo –inmediato y a largo plazo- en el territorio de ejecución. La literatura económica ha puesto de manifiesto esa relación, aunque su importancia varíe en función de los modelos y metodología para su cuantificación, el país y período considerados. Cuando se analizan inversiones en territorios concretos dentro de un estado se plantea la dificultad de cuantificar la territorialidad de sus efectos, ya que estos no se restringen al territorio donde se emplaza la inversión. Pero ese desbordamiento extraterritorial resulta, si cabe, más evidente en el caso de los efectos de corto plazo de la ejecución. Efectivamente, existen otros flujos indirectos ligados a la actividad de ejecución, normalmente realizada mediante concursos públicos y empresas adjudicatarias, que pueden generar otro tipo de flujos económicos hacia territorios diferentes al cual se localiza la inversión y que dependen de la localización de las empresas adjudicatarias y proveedores. En este artículo nos centramos específicamente en los que pueden ser denominados como flujos interterritoriales no explícitos que derivan de la ejecución de obra pública realizada por la Administración Central en un territorio y que se materializan a través de los beneficios industriales y gastos generales que ésta genera y que suponen un flujo hacia aquellos territorios donde se ubican las sedes de las empresas adjudicatarias de obra pública, promoviendo importantes externalidades positivas tanto en el proceso de concentración-centralización empresarial y capacidad fiscal. Una vez acotado el problema y obtenida la información de base realizamos una cuantificación de tales efectos extraterritoriales derivados de la licitación de obra pública del Estado en la Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia para el período 2005-2012. Los resultados muestran una clara extraversión de los beneficios y los impuestos en favor de la Comunidad sede de las grandes empresas de obra pública (CA de Madrid) y ello constituye un flujo complementario relevante a la hora de analizar los flujos fiscales entre territorios (balanzas fiscales). Abstract:In the large literature on the effects of public investment in infrastructure on economic growth, a phenomenon related to the spillover effects that derives from such investment in infrastructures promoted by the Central Administration is omitted. The fact that the public spending on infrastructure is executed through the concession of work to a private company, generates a series of flows among different territories, promoting not only a benefit in that territory where the infrastructure is built, also, in the territory where the companies that execute the work are concentrated. We observe that the Central Administration carries out a policy of public expenditure in Galicia through, in this case, investment in infrastructure, but at the same time this policy generates a series of economic flows that return to the territory where it is located the contractor company. This way is assumed that such investment will bring with it the generation of: 1. On the one hand we would have the creation of the tangible fixed asset: the creation of the infrastructure in a certain territory. 2. On the other hand we would have the economic activity generated in the infrastructure construction process, which materializes, by one side, in the purchases of goods and specialized services and group purchases and suppliers, and on the other side, through of the so-called Overhead Costs. 3. Finally, we would have as another generated asset, the Business Profit that if is obtained from the bidding of the work itself and it that would accumulate in those territories where the headquarters of the companies are located. As a result of this, also it is generated an increase in income and related taxes, such as the Corporation Tax and the Property Tax, in those territories where the beneficiary companies concentrate. The key point is that the economic activity linked to the execution of investment/public purchasing represents nowadays a fundamental policy of the Spanish economy, and indeed the location of the awarding companies is not territorially equidistributed, rather the opposite, it presents a very strong concentration in a small number of Autonomous Communities or cities. This sector, in particular the large companies of Construction and Infrastructure, is based mainly in the capital of the State and therefore, it is possible to formulate the hypothesis that part of the public expenditure executed by the State in peripheral Autonomous Communities acts as a development / engine of the sector of the construction and industry and services associated to said sector located in the capital, constituting one of its most important productive specializations. Against this background, we believe it is necessary to open the reflection on such extraterritorial effects, that is, those flows that are generated through public expenditure promoted by the central Administration and , particularly those related to public investment or public purchases financed with that expenditure and that it materializes concretely in the so-called Industrial Profits and Overhead Costs, insofar as they act as a motor for an economic activity of the powerful business sector that executes these activities Taking in account the indicated above, this academic work tries to indicate and quantify the existence of a flow, specifically the industrial profits and overhead costs, which go from the different territories to the capital of the State and that are a consequence of the State investment in infrastructure in Galicia. The methodology developed for it follows the next points. 1. Identification of the 20 main companies awarded public works tendered by the State in Galicia and the location of their headquarters, as well as the volume awarded by each of the companies for the period 2005-2012. The selection of the period has been based on two criteria. The first of these is that during those years, the largest investment in public works of the Central Administration in Galicia takes place. The second reason is that in that period two sub-phases can be observed: one of expansion of public spending and another one of containment of the public cost In order to carry out this exercise, the data provided by the annual reports of the General State Administration in Galicia and the data published by the Galician Construction Federation, are used. This last source of data collects the volume of adjudication (cost of work, percentage of industrial benefits and VAT) per company and level of Administration (Central Administration, CCAA, Provincial Councils and Provincial Councils) Although the Galician Construction Federation can not be considered an official source, the information issued is selected from official sources. For this, the Federation carries out a follow-up of the profiles of contractors of the different levels of Public Administration (Central Administration, Autonomous Communities, City Councils and Provincial Councils). 2. Estimation of the industrial profits associated with such companies. The General Regulation of the Contracts of Public Administration Act, approved by Royal Decree 1098/2001 establishes that the percentage of the industrial profits must be the 6%. But this percentage may vary due to multiple reasons: the final price of the work, company feature, scales economies, etc. To obtain a more realistic approximation to the percentage of industrial profits, it has been chosen the database of the Bank of Spain. Specifically the database of “Sector Ratios of Non-Financial Companies”, focusing on the activity sector “Construction of roads and railways, bridges and tunnels (F401)” and in companies with incomes bigger than 50 million Euros. In such database, the profitability is understood as: Result before Taxes / Own Funds. On the other hand, the ratio is established for three quartiles (Q1, Q2, Q3). In the present work, the Q1 has been chosen, since it includes the value over which 75% of the aggregate companies are located. 3. Estimation of the overhead costs associated with the 20 main public works contractors in Galicia. Such calculation is based on what is established in the General Regulation of the Public Administration Contracts Law, approved by Royal Decree 1098/2001. In this case the law establishes that the percentage must be placed among 13%-17% 4. Finally, we estimate the whole of industrial profits and overhead cots obtained by the main companies awarded public works in Galicia for the period 2005-2012. The results indicate, on the one hand, that the main companies awarded public works promoted by the Central Administration in Galicia, are located in Madrid. In this sense, this territory becomes the main beneficiary of industrial profits and overhead costs of all state. The industrial profits and the overhead costs obtained for the Madrid companies’ reach, for the whole period, a total of 1.211 million Euros, representing 16,91% of the total volume awarded in Galicia by the Administration Central. This amount is close to that received by Galicia for the same period, from the Interregional Compensation Fund.