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Costos de formalización de las empresas: medición de los costos de transacción en Brasil

Author

Listed:
  • Decio Zylbersztajn

    (Universidad de Sao Paulo)

  • Carolina T. Graca

    (Universidad de Sao Paulo)

Abstract

In the presence of positive transaction costs, institutions and the architecture of organizations take on fundamental importance. This paper measures costs of opening firms in the Brazilian garment industry. The measure of costs to start up a new business in the garment industry in Brazil shows a large variation between regions in the same city and between different areas of the country. Nine different procedures were found along with a time span of 64 days and an average cost of 11,3% of the GDP per capita. Also 39% of the firms declared that they operated informally for some time.

Suggested Citation

  • Decio Zylbersztajn & Carolina T. Graca, 2003. "Costos de formalización de las empresas: medición de los costos de transacción en Brasil," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 5(9), pages 146-165, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:5:y:2003:i:9:p:146-165
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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/dzylbersztajn9.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Klaes, Matthias, 2000. "The Birth of the Concept of Transaction Costs: Issues and Controversies," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 9(4), pages 567-593, December.
    4. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    5. Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135, February.
    6. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fredriksson, Anders, 2014. "Bureaucracy intermediaries, corruption and red tape," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 256-273.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    entry costs; transaction costs measurement; firm behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • L69 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Other

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