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Las redes del narcotráfico y sus interacciones: un modelo teórico

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  • Leonardo Raffo López
  • José Luis Segura

Abstract

En este artículo se propone un modelo teórico que ayuda a entender el funcionamiento de las redes de defensa y corrupción del narcotráfico. Con base en las teorías de juegos y de redes se analizan las interacciones estratégicas entre los narcotraficantes y sus agentes. Se prueba que la densidad de las redes es un determinante fundamental de la probabilidad de supervivencia de los narcotraficantes y de los salarios que pagan a sus hombres; y que la eficacia de las políticas de represión de la oferta depende de la densidad de las redes.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Raffo López & José Luis Segura, 2015. "Las redes del narcotráfico y sus interacciones: un modelo teórico," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 17(32), pages 183-212, January-J.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:17:y:2015:i:32:p:183-212
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    Cited by:

    1. Leonardo Raffo López & José Luis Segura, 2018. "La ineficacia de las políticas de represión a la oferta de drogas: una explicación alternativa," Ensayos de Economía 16782, Universidad Nacional de Colombia Sede Medellín.
    2. Boris Salazar-Trujillo & María Isabel Caicedo-Hurtado & Gildardo Vanegas-Muñoz, 2021. "Afinidades violentas: la evolución de la red de narcotraficantes del norte del Valle," Revista Sociedad y Economía, Universidad del Valle, CIDSE, issue 42, January.
    3. Miguel Serrano López, 2020. "Violencia y corrupción como estrategias de maximización en mercados ilegales: el caso de la coca," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, vol. 39(81), pages 949-974, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    narcotráfico; redes de delincuencia; mercados ilegales; teoría de juegos; teoría de las redes sociales; políticas de represión;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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