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Opportunismus oder Ungewissheit? Die Arbeitgeberhaltungen zum mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrat (Opportunism or Uncertainty? Analyzing Employers’ Attitudes towards Supervisory Board Codetermination)

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  • Hoepner, Martin
  • Waclawczyk, Maximilian

Abstract

In der Mitbestimmungsdebatte der 2000er Jahre ueberraschten die Fuehrungskraefte vieler Grossunternehmen mit positiven aeusserungen zur Unternehmensmitbestimmung. Damit widersprachen sie den Forderungen ihrer Verbaende, die sich dafuer einsetzten, die paritaetische Mitbestimmung abzuschaffen und auf eine Drittelbeteiligung zurueckzufuehren. Dieser Sachverhalt laesst sich auf zweierlei Weise interpretieren. Der machtressourcentheoretischen Interpretation zufolge vermieden es die Fuehrungskraefte aus strategischen Gruenden, ihre Mitbestimmungsaversion in die oeffentlichkeit zu tragen, um die Kooperationsbereitschaft interner Arbeitnehmervertreter nicht zu unterminieren. Die produktionsregimetheoretische Interpretation geht hingegen von einem fundamentalen Praeferenzwandel aufseiten der Fuehrungskraefte aus. Wir vergleichen die Haltungen der Verbaende und Unternehmen in den siebziger und den 2000er Jahren und zeigen, dass die machtressourcentheoretische Interpretation der empirischen ueberpruefung nicht standhaelt. Der Schluessel zum Verstaendnis der vorgefundenen Konstellation liegt nicht in vermeintlichem Opportunismus der Unternehmensleitungen, sondern in der Ungewissheit der Folgen institutionellen Wandels. (In the course of the codetermination debate of the 2000s, managers of large companies surprisingly made codetermination-friendly statements by claiming to disagree with employer federation demands to reduce the number of employee seats on supervisory boards from one half to one third. This claim can be interpreted in two different ways. According to the power resource interpretation, managers were reluctant to articulate publically their aversion to codetermination so as not to undermine cooperation with the employee representatives in their own companies. In contrast, the production regime interpretation assumes that managers really had changed their basic preferences. We compare the attitudes of managers and employer federations in the 1970s and the 2000s and show that the power resource interpretation cannot be upheld. The key to understanding the divergent attitudes between managers and federations in the 2000s does not lie in the supposed opportunism of managers, but in uncertainty about the effects of institutional change.)

Suggested Citation

  • Hoepner, Martin & Waclawczyk, Maximilian, 2012. "Opportunismus oder Ungewissheit? Die Arbeitgeberhaltungen zum mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrat (Opportunism or Uncertainty? Analyzing Employers’ Attitudes towards Supervisory Board Codetermination)," Industrielle Beziehungen - Zeitschrift fuer Arbeit, Organisation und Management - The German Journal of Industrial Relations, Rainer Hampp Verlag, vol. 19(3), pages 290-313.
  • Handle: RePEc:rai:indbez:doi_10.1688/1862-0035_indb_2012_03_hoepner
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; codetermination; employers; preference formation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy

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