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Building an institutional framework for monetary stability: the case of Italy (1979-1994)

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  • F. PASSACANTANDO

    (Banca d'Italia)

Abstract

Italy's monetary regime has experienced significant developments from 1979 to 1994. The independence of the central bank from the government was strengthened by several reforms. The period under review is characterised by monetary policy consistent with the Italian government's inflation targets following the abandonment of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in Sep. 1992. Factors leading to the replacement of one type of institutional arrangement by another and the effects on monetary policy performance are examined. The steps followed and the problems encountered in implementing a system which would ensure monetary stability are also presented.

Suggested Citation

  • F. Passacantando, 1996. "Building an institutional framework for monetary stability: the case of Italy (1979-1994)," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(196), pages 83-132.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1996:14
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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10609/10493
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Richard H. Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1998. "Monetary policy rules in practice," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Mar.
    2. Bouabdallah, Othman & Jacquinot, Pascal & Patella, Valeria, 2023. "Monetary/fiscal policy regimes in post-war Europe," Working Paper Series 2871, European Central Bank.
    3. Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2022. "Instrument-Based versus Target-Based Rules," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(1), pages 312-345.
    4. Forte, Antonio, 2024. "Monetary policy transmission in a high inflation environment: a view from the past," MPRA Paper 121396, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Basham, James & Roland, Aanor, 2014. "Policy-making of the European Central Bank during the crisis: Do personalities matter?," IPE Working Papers 38/2014, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE).
    6. Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1998. "Monetary policy rules in practice Some international evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1033-1067, June.
    7. Lucia Quaglia & Ivo Maes, 2003. "France's and Italy's Policies on European Monetary Integration: a comparison of 'strong' and 'weak' states," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 10, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    8. David Cobham, 2011. "From Bretton Woods to Inflation Targeting: Financial Change and Monetary Policy Evolution in Europe," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Mongi Boughzala & David Cobham (ed.), Inflation Targeting in MENA Countries, chapter 7, pages 171-192, Palgrave Macmillan.
    9. Eugenio Gaiotti & Alessandro Secchi, 2012. "Monetary policy and fiscal dominance in Italy from the early 1970s to the adoption of the euro: a review," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 141, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    10. Hattori, Masazumi, 2004. "A theory of sovereign debt roll-over crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24700, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank independence; Italian monetary policy; Inflation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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