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La politique de diffusion de l'information : la transparence des banques centrales est-elle toujours préférable ?

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  • Jean-Pierre Allegret
  • Camille Cornand

Abstract

[eng] Communication Policy: is Central Bank Transparency Always Suitable? Transparency is one of the main pillars of central banks and international institutions. From their point of view, higher informational transparency improves their efficacy. The aim of this paper is to evaluate in what extent this strategy is beneficial or not. It proposes a survey of the literature based on coordination games. We show that an increase in informational transparency can lead to sub-optimal results. Indeed in providing a focal point for the beliefs of agents, public information facilitates coordination and so over-reaction behaviors. We do not deduce from this result that transparency is useless. We stress that it is necessary to adapt the communication policy to an environment characterized by strategic complementarities. To this end, we analyze several tools of information disclosure. [fre] Jean-Pierre Allegret Camille Cornand La politique de diffusion de l'information : la transparence des banques centrales est-elle toujours préférable ? La transparence est devenue l'un des piliers des banques centrales et des institutions internationales afin d'accroître leur efficacité. Dans cet article, nous nous interrogeons sur le bien fondé de cette stratégie en proposant une synthèse de la littérature existante. A partir de l'approche en termes de jeux de coordination, nous montrons qu'un accroissement de la transparence en matière d'information peut conduire à des résultats non optimaux. Cette caractérisation repose sur le fait que l'information publique facilite la coordination entre les agents et favorise par là même les comportements de sur-réaction. Cependant, nous ne déduisons pas d'un tel résultat le fait que la transparence n'est pas utile. Nous montrons que celle-ci doit tenir compte des complémentarités stratégiques entre les agents. Les banques centrales et les institutions internationales ont à leur disposition plusieurs outils de diffusion d'information qui sont analysés dans cet article.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006. "La politique de diffusion de l'information : la transparence des banques centrales est-elle toujours préférable ?," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 21(1), pages 87-126.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2006_num_21_1_1590
    DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2006.1590
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2006.1590
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    1. Trabelsi, Emna, 2010. "Central bank communication: fragmentation as an engine for limiting the publicity degree of information," MPRA Paper 26647, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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