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Durée des contrats et indemnisation du chômage. Une analyse quantitative du dualisme du marché du travail français

Author

Listed:
  • Laurence Rioux
  • Javier Ortega

Abstract

[fre] L'interaction entre l'indemnisation du chômage et la durée des contrats est analysée dans le cadre d'un modèle d'appariement. Les chômeurs après un emploi en CDI ont droit à une longue période d'indemnisation par l'assurance. Les chômeurs après un emploi temporaire sont peu ou pas indemnisés. Or les premiers reçoivent des offres d'emploi en CDI et CDD, alors que les seconds ne trouvent que des CDD. Les variables du modèle sont estimées à partir du Panel européen, puis des réformes de l'indemnisation du chômage et de la législation sur les contrats temporaires sont simulées. Des allocations chômage (d'assurance ou d'assistance) plus généreuses accroissent faiblement le taux de chômage et le bien-être social. Allonger la durée légale des CDD ou accroître leur taux de transformation en CDI réduit fortement le taux de chômage et améliore le bien-être de tous. [eng] Duration of contracts and unemployment compensation: a quantitative analysis of the dualism of the french labor market. . The interplay between unemployment compensation and the duration of contracts is analysed in a matching framework. The unemployed after a permanent job are entitled to a long period of unemployment Insurance (UI). The unemployed after a temporary job are not eligible for UI. The former receive offers for permanent and temporary jobs while the latter find only temporary jobs. The variables of the model are estimated using the European Panel. Then some reforms of the unemployment compensation system and of the temporary contracts' legislation are simulated. More generous insurance or assistance benefits slightly raise the unemployment rate and the social welfare. Increasing the legal duration of temporary contracts or their transformation rate in permanent contracts strongly decreases the rate of unemployment and improves the welfare of all the individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence Rioux & Javier Ortega, 2002. "Durée des contrats et indemnisation du chômage. Une analyse quantitative du dualisme du marché du travail français," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(6), pages 1273-1303.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_6_410469
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.2002.410469
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2002.410469
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    Cited by:

    1. R. Giuliano & B. Mahy & F. Rycx & G. Vermeylen, 2017. "Does corporate social responsibility make over-educated workers more productive?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(6), pages 587-605, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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