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La règle de fermeture des banques. L'intérêt de l'ambiguïté constructive

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  • Michel Dietsch
  • Brigitte Godbillon

Abstract

[eng] The closure rule of banks : the advantages of the constructive ambiguity. . This paper surveys recent theoretical and empirical works dealing with the closure rule of banks. First, we discuss the reasons why some countries have implemented reforms of the closure rule, in order to reinforce the stringency of the rule and to introduce early closure and prompt corrective action. The main reason of these reforms was to reduce moral hazard. Then, we show that the introduction of ambiguity in the rule gives a good alternative to these reforms. Indeed, the ambi­guity gives banks additional incentives to avoid excessive risk taking. [fre] La règle de fermeture des banques. L'intérêt de l'ambiguïté constructive. . Au cours des récentes années, les difficultés bancaires ont conduit certains législateurs à réformer la règle de fermeture des banques. Généralement, ces réformes ont conduit à rendre les règles plus strictes et plus contraignantes pour les autorités elles-mêmes. On montre ici qu'introduire de l'ambiguïté dans la règle offre une alternative à de telles réformes. L'ambiguïté de la règle de fermeture permet en effet de diminuer la prise de risque, vérifiant la pertinence de la notion d'« ambiguïté constructive » souvent utilisée par les autorités bancaires.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Dietsch & Brigitte Godbillon, 1997. "La règle de fermeture des banques. L'intérêt de l'ambiguïté constructive," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 707-718.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_3_409909
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1997.409909
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1997.409909
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "On banking and intermediation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 469-487, April.
    2. Mark E. Levonian, 1991. "What happens if banks are closed \"early\"?," Proceedings 321, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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