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Emplois publics et distribution des revenus

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  • Claude Le Pen

Abstract

[eng] Public employment and distribution of income. Claude Le Pen. This paper investigates the influence of jniblic expenditure on distribution of income through the labour market.. The demand of labour from public administrations exercices a differentiel effect on each workers group on a labour market with segmentation, and hence contributes ta determine the income gap. It is shown that, public production being held constant, each group lias interest to act politically to bias in its favours the actual « labour-mix ». Next, « labour-mix » being fixed, workers the government has the greatest « propen.sity to employ » have interest to support programs for extension of public production.. The quantification of the lutter effect with french data, shows that its sense is anti-redistributive but its intensity is not likely to prevent others socio-economic factors from reducing the income gap. [fre] Ce texte s'intéresse à un canal de transmission peu connu des dépenses publiques vers les inégalités de revenus : le marché du travail.. La demande de travail des administrations sur un marché segmenté exerce un effet différentiel sur les différents groupes et influence donc sur la structure salariale. On montre ainsi qu'à production publique donnée, chaque groupe de travailleurs a intérêt à agir pour biaiser en sa faveur le « complexe » de travail effectivement utilisé. A complexe donné, les travailleurs qui bénéficient de la plus forte « pro­pension à employer » de la part de l'Etat ont intérêt à favoriser la production publique.. La quantification de ce dernier effet sur des données françaises montre qu'il est contre-redistributif mais que son intensité n'est toutefois pas telle qu'il puisse inverser la tendance à la fermeture de l'écart salarial dû à d'autres facteurs écono­miques et sociaux.

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  • Claude Le Pen, 1985. "Emplois publics et distribution des revenus," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 36(4), pages 715-740.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1985_num_36_4_408865
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1985.408865
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1985.408865
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Keller, Wouter J., 1981. "Public sector employment and the distribution of income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 235-249, April.
    2. Gordon Tullock, 1974. "Dynamic hypothesis on bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 127-131, September.
    3. James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, 1977. "The expanding public sector: Wagner squared," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 147-150, September.
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