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La théorie économique de l'auto-protection

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  • Jean-Jacques Laffont

Abstract

[fre] L'objet de cette note est de prendre en compte le phénomène d'autoprotection dans une théorie des assurances d'équilibre général. Après avoir mis en évidence la possibilité d'inexistence de l'équilibre concurrentiel et son inefficacité très générale, lorsqu'il existe, nous étudions des politiques économiques susceptibles de rétablir l'optimalité parétienne : prime variable liée à l'activité d'autoprotection, prime variable liée à la quantité d'assurance sélectionnée, prime définie sur la base des déclarations de l'agent et contrôlée par une cour de justice, etc. [eng] The economic theory of self-protection. . The purpose of this paper is to take info account self'protection in a general equilibrium theory of Insurance. First, we show why the competitive equilibrium may fait to exist and why it is in general Pareto inefficient, when it cxists. Then, we study a number of economic policies designed to restore Pareto efficiency : Insurance premium variable with the level of self~protection, with the quantity of Insurance, Insurance premium defined on the basis of the agent's declarations, etc.

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  • Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1976. "La théorie économique de l'auto-protection," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 27(4), pages 561-588.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1976_num_27_4_408274
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1976.408274
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1976.408274
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    1. Edmond Malinvaud, 1974. "The Allocation of Individual Risks in Large Markets," International Economic Association Series, in: Jacques H. Drèze (ed.), Allocation under Uncertainty: Equilibrium and Optimality, chapter 8, pages 110-125, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. MOSSIN, Jan, 1968. "Aspects of rational insurance purchasing," LIDAM Reprints CORE 23, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Green, Jerry & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1975. "Competitive inefficiencies in the presence of constrained transactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 343-357, June.
    4. Gould, John P, 1969. "The Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Selection of Optimal Deductibles for a Given Insurance Policy," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 143-151, April.
    5. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    6. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
    7. Helpman, Elhanan & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1975. "On moral hazard in general equilibrium theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 8-23, February.
    8. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    9. Malinvaud, E, 1973. "Markets for an Exchange Economy with Individual Risks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 383-410, May.
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    1. François-Régis Mahieu, 1989. "Principes économiques et sociétés africaines," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 30(120), pages 725-753.

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