Author
Listed:
- Annette L. Nazareth
- Gabriel D. Rosenberg
Abstract
[fre] Le système de régulation des marchés financiers aux États-Unis dispose de régulateurs multiples, aux niveaux fédéral et national, dont les compétences se chevauchent. Le résultat est à la fois une sur-et une sous-régulation – dans certains cas, une même entité se trouve soumise à différentes règles (parfois incohérentes) pour une activité identique. Parallèlement, certaines entités demeurent non réglementées, au beau milieu d’un patchwork complexe de lois. La réforme de la régulation financière aux États-Unis était une opportunité unique de remodeler cette réglementation archaïque et alambiquée. Cependant, les rédacteurs du Dodd-Frank Act – un acte législatif de 849 pages incluant 400 dispositions exigeant l’élaboration de nouvelles règles d’application, impliquant 25 régulateurs et en créant 2 nouveaux – ont repris de nombreux travers de ce système. Cet article se concentre sur l’un des problèmes les plus clairs de la structure américaine exacerbé par le Dodd-Frank Act – la division de la supervision des titres, des futures et (désormais) des swaps entre la Securities and Exchange Commission et la Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Classification JEL : G01, G13, G18. [eng] The New Regulation of Swaps : A Lost Opportunity.. TheUSregulatory system has multiple regulators on the federal and state level, manywith overlapping jurisdiction. The result has been both overregulation and underregulation – in some cases, the same entity may be subject to different (and perhaps inconsistent) regulation for the same activity, while in other cases certain activities may remain unregulated in the midst of a complex regulatory patchwork. Regulatory reform in the United States provided a unique opportunity for reform of this archaic and byzantine regulatory structure. Yet, remarkably, the drafters of Dodd-Frank Act – an 849-page bill that includes 400 rulemaking requirements, implicates 25 regulators and creates 2 new ones – perpetuated many of these flaws. This Article focuses on one of the clearest examples of complication in the U. S. regulatory structure exacerbated by the Dodd-Frank Act – the division of the regulation of securities, futures and (now) swaps between the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. . Classification JEL : G01, G13, G18.
Suggested Citation
Annette L. Nazareth & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, 2012.
"La nouvelle régulation des swaps : une opportunité manquée,"
Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 105(1), pages 281-292.
Handle:
RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2012_num_105_1_5976
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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