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La gestion déléguée dans les fonds de capital-investissement : relation d’agence et clauses contractuelles des fonds

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  • Xavier Mahieux

Abstract

[fre] La gestion déléguée dans le capital-investissement s’est développée massivement en France depuis les années 1980 avec la création des fonds à durée de vie limitée (FCPR), adaptés à l’investissement dans le non-coté. Cet article analyse les relations entre gérants et investisseurs au vu de la théorie de l’agence. Il montre comment les clauses contractuelles des règlements des fonds de capital-investissement s’adressent aux différents risques encourus par les investisseurs du fait de cette relation d’agence spécifique et permettent de les réduire. En dépit de leur étendue et des mécanismes qu’elles mettent en oeuvre, il apparaît toutefois que ces clauses ne permettent pas d’éliminer totalement les risques de hasard moral. . Classification JEL : D82, G24, G34. [eng] Delegated Portfolio Management in the Private Equity Industry : Agency Relationship and Covenants of Funds . Since the mid 1980’s, the development of the French private equity sector has heavily relied on delegated portfolio management. Private equity funds are structured so that their legal and financial framework is well fitted to the needs of investors regarding the specific features of private securities investments, notably illiquidity. This paper analyzes the particular agency relationship binding funds managers and investors in the private equity sector. The major moral hazard risks faced by the investors are extensively treated in the different covenants of the funds in order to prevent their appearance. Despite this, all risks cannot be avoided as has been highlighted during the recent financial crisis. . Classification JEL : D82, G24, G34.

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier Mahieux, 2010. "La gestion déléguée dans les fonds de capital-investissement : relation d’agence et clauses contractuelles des fonds," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 97(2), pages 253-274.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2010_num_97_2_5404
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2010.5404
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2010.5404
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven N. Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, 2005. "Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1791-1823, August.
    2. Gompers, Paul & Lerner, Josh, 1996. "The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 463-498, October.
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    4. Lerner, Josh & Schoar, Antoinette, 2004. "The illiquidity puzzle: theory and evidence from private equity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 3-40, April.
    5. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315.
    6. Bertrand Jacquillat, 2008. "Les rémunérations des dirigeants dans le capital-investissement," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 93(3), pages 155-166.
    7. Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar & Wan Wongsunwai, 2007. "Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 731-764, April.
    8. Olivier Gottschalg & Ludovic Phalippou, 2008. "La vérité sur les performances dans le capital-investissement," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 93(3), pages 201-211.
    9. Andrew Metrick, 2010. "The Economics of Private Equity Funds," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(6), pages 2303-2341, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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