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La régulation de la demande de soins : le rôle de l’assurance maladie dans la formation de la consommation de biens et services de santé

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  • Laurent Caussat
  • Denis Raynaud

Abstract

[eng] The regulation of health care demand : health insurance and the frame of individual health expenses . According to the « moral hazard » hypothesis, a health insurance scheme which provides a high level of compensation of health expenditures offsets any incentive for individuals to restrain their resort to the health care system. Most of those studies find a strong and positive correlation between the size of the health insurance coverage and the amount of health expenditures. According to new figures that we also report, the gap between average ambulatory health expenditures of individuals who own a private supplementary health insurance scheme and of those who benefit only from the public health insurance scheme is estimated by + 29%. Part of this gap relies on the improvement of the health insurance coverage of low income people who entered the CMU. However, these outcomes bring a ground for policies which aim at monitoring the health care demand, using an adequate regulation of the reimbursement provided by the public and private insurance schemes. . JEL classification : I11, I18 [fre] Selon la théorie du « risque moral », un haut degré d'assurance, en garantissant aux assurés la stabilité de leur niveau de vie lorsqu'ils tombent malades quel que soit le niveau de leurs dépenses de soins, les dissuade de recourir modérément au système de santé. Cet article rappelle les résultats des plus significatifs de ces études. Nous présentons enfin de nouveaux résultats pour la France qui évaluent à + 29 % l'écart relatif moyen entre les dépenses de soins ambulatoires des personnes disposant d'une couverture complémentaire et celles bénéficiant seulement des remboursements de la Sécurité sociale. Une part de cet écart est imputable à la diminution des renoncements aux soins des personnes à revenus modestes qui bénéficient de la CMU complémentaire. Cependant, ces résultats apportent un fondement à des politiques visant à orienter la demande de soins à l'aide d'une régulation appropriée du remboursement. . Classification JEL : I11, I18

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Caussat & Denis Raynaud, 2004. "La régulation de la demande de soins : le rôle de l’assurance maladie dans la formation de la consommation de biens et services de santé," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 76(3), pages 129-151.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2004_num_76_3_4918
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2004.4918
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2004.4918
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Durand, Franck & Geoffard, Pierre-Yves, 1998. "Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 499-511, May.
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    3. Robert G. Evans, 1974. "Supplier-Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and Implications," International Economic Association Series, in: Mark Perlman (ed.), The Economics of Health and Medical Care, chapter 10, pages 162-173, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Rice, Thomas, 1993. "Demand curves, economists, and desert islands: A response to Feldman and Dowd," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 201-204, July.
    5. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Batifoulier, 2014. "De l’aléa moral du patient aux inégalités d’accès aux soins," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-7, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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