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Dette subordonnée, discipline de marché et réforme réglementaire

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  • Adrian Pop

Abstract

[fre] Les propositions de réforme de la réglementation bancaire incluent des éléments de discipline de marché qui complètent naturellement les instruments traditionnels. Une politique par laquelle les grandes banques sont obligées d'émettre régulièrement un montant minimum de dette subordonnée peut s'avérer efficace pour réduire les problèmes engendrés par l'aléa moral. Cette proposition vise à créer une classe distincte d'investisseurs dont les incitations viennent s'aligner sur celles des autorités de régulation et qui surveillent, analysent et finalement disciplinent les comportements risqués des institutions bancaires. Des tâches, accomplies jusqu'à présent prioritairement par les autorités de tutelle, pourront être partagées avec les acteurs privés du marché et, par conséquent, le coût de la réglementation est susceptible de diminuer. L'objet de cet article est d'étudier la pertinence d'une telle politique, les modalités pour l'intégrer dans le dispositif réglementaire déjà en place et son architecture optimale. . Classification JEL : G21, G28 [eng] Sub-debt, market discipline, and regulatory reform . The proposals regarding the reform of banking regulation equally include elements of market discipline that are naturally added to the traditional instruments. More precisely, a policy by which some large banks are forced to regularly issue a certain minimum amount of subordinated and not guaranteed debt can prove itself effective in mitigating some problems generated by moral hazard and regulatory forbearance in banking. These proposals aim to create a distinct class of investors whose incentives can be aligned with those of the bank regulators, that is monitoring, analyzing, and finally disciplining the risky behaviors of bank institutions. In this way, the tasks formally accomplished only by the regulators would now be shared with the private actors of the market. The goal of this article is to study the relevance of the mandatory subordinated debt policy, the ways of integrating it in the actual stare of the art of bank regulation and its optimal design. . JEL classifications : G21, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Adrian Pop, 2003. "Dette subordonnée, discipline de marché et réforme réglementaire," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 71(2), pages 261-276.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2003_num_71_2_4862
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2003.4862
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2003.4862
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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